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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 The Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association 
("PIGA") is an association of independent property and casualty 
insurers within Pennsylvania, created by The Pennsylvania 
Insurance Guaranty Act, 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1701 et seq. 
(1970) for the purpose of providing a means of relatively prompt 
payment of covered claims in the stead of an insolvent insurer.  
Membership in PIGA is required before an insurer is authorized to 
write insurance policies within Pennsylvania.  A "covered claim" 
under the Act must be the claim of a Pennsylvania "resident" or 
must pertain to property permanently located in Pennsylvania. 
 In this interlocutory appeal arising out of multiple 
claims seeking multi-millions of dollars in asbestos personal 
injury damages, T&N, plc, an English corporation with its 
principal place of business in England, seeks to recover from 
PIGA over $5 million under the terms of a settlement agreement 
with the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company.  American 
Mutual is the insolvent insurer of T&N's now dissolved 
Pennsylvania asbestos manufacturing subsidiary, the Keasbey and 
Mattison Company.  Since Keasbey's dissolution, T&N has been the 
target of thousands of claims brought by individuals alleging 
bodily injury and/or property damage caused by Keasbey's 
 
 
asbestos-containing products.  Following an action which T&N 
commenced against American Mutual in the federal district court, 
T&N and American Mutual negotiated a settlement agreement which 
bound American Mutual to pay T&N a certain sum under the Keasbey 
policies.  When American Mutual defaulted and was adjudged 
insolvent, T&N commenced this action against PIGA. 
 We must decide whether T&N's claim based on the terms 
of the settlement agreement is deemed to have arisen under 
American Mutual's property and casualty insurance policy so as to 
fall within the scope of covered claims under the Act, or whether 
the agreement served to extinguish the Keasbey policies.  We must 
also decide whether T&N's claim satisfies the residency 
requirement of the Act, either by virtue of Keasbey's 
Pennsylvania residency while it was still viable, T&N's alleged 
alter ego relationship with Keasbey, and/or by T&N's direct 
Pennsylvania contacts.  We must further decide the merits of 
T&N's assertion that recovery from PIGA is authorized to the 
extent that the underlying personal injury claimants are 
Pennsylvania residents.  Finally, we must decide whether T&N has 
a potential claim against PIGA for claims arising from the loss 
or liability to any property permanently situated in 
Pennsylvania. 
 We conclude that the settlement agreement did indeed 
arise under the insurance policies, and hence may support a 
covered claim.  We also conclude that T&N may have a viable 
covered claim with respect to affected property, but that it does 
not otherwise meet the residency requirements of the Act.  We 
 
 
hold, however, that because the settlement agreement encompassed 
all of T&N's claims against the insurance company, T&N has only 
one potential covered claim which is subject to the $300,000 
limit under the Act. 
 
                               I.   
 Keasbey and Mattison Company was a Pennsylvania 
corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania 
and which manufactured asbestos-containing products from the 
early 1930's until 1967.  Keasbey was the named insured on 
standard liability polices issued by American Mutual Liability 
Insurance Company from at least April 1, 1946 through October 1, 
1965.  The policies provided primary coverage for asbestos and 
other latent disease product liability claims.  In 1962, Keasbey 
sold its assets and filed for dissolution under Pennsylvania law.  
The dissolution became final in 1967.     
 T&N, plc, is a corporation organized under the laws of 
England and having its principal place of business in England.  
From 1934 until 1938, T&N owned the majority of Keasbey's stock.  
From 1938 until Keasbey's dissolution, T&N owned one hundred 
percent of Keasbey's stock either directly or indirectly.   
 Beginning in 1978, T&N was sued by thousands of 
individuals who alleged that since T&N was the sole shareholder 
of Keasbey, it was liable to them for the bodily injury they had 
suffered due to their exposure to asbestos.  As a result, in 1982 
T&N filed a declaratory judgment action against American Mutual 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
 
 
seeking coverage for over 1,000 asbestos claims.  With respect to 
seven selected asbestos cases, the district court entered partial 
summary judgment in favor of T&N.  It found that due to its 
status as a shareholder of Keasbey, T&N was an additional insured 
under the policies which were issued to Keasbey.  The district 
court then directed the parties to attempt to reach an agreement 
regarding the amount of damages T&N was entitled to receive.   
 Subsequently, T&N and American Mutual entered into a 
settlement agreement which provided in pertinent part: 
 2.  This Agreement is intended to confer rights  
 and benefits only upon T&N and American Mutual, 
 and is not intended to confer any right or benefit 
 upon any other person.  No person other than T&N 
 or American Mutual shall have any legally  
 enforceable right under this Agreement.  All 
 rights of action for any breach of this Agreement  
 are hereby reserved to T&N and American Mutual. 
 
 5.  This Agreement is the entire agreement  
 between T&N and American Mutual.  All antecedent  
 or contemporaneous extrinsic representations and  
 warranties made in the negotiation and preparation 
 of this Agreement are intended to be merged in the 
 Agreement and of no further effect.  
  
 6.  For the purposes of resolving their dispute 
 American Mutual and T&N agree that the limits of  
 liability for all Keasbey policies shall be a total  
 of          1.   
 
 7.  American Mutual shall pay to T&N the aforesaid   
 limits of all Keasbey policies . . . as well as a  
 portion of T&N's defense costs. . . . 
 
 8.  Upon execution of this Agreement, American  
 Mutual shall be considered to have no further  
 duties or obligations based upon, arising out of  
                     
1.   The district court deleted the amount from the opinion, 
stating that because the settlement was filed under seal, there 
was no valid reason to disclose the amount.   
 
 
 or related to any policy of insurance issued  
 to Keasbey by American Mutual and all such  
 policies shall be considered exhausted, null and  
 void and of no further force or effect.   
 (District Court Opinion dated May 28, 1992, pp.3-4) 
 
 
 T&N alleges that American Mutual defaulted on this 
agreement because it failed to pay installments which were due on 
January 3, 1989 and January 4, 1990.  In an unrelated matter, on 
March 9, 1989, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found 
that American Mutual was insolvent, appointed a permanent 
receiver, and ordered that the company be liquidated.   
 On July 30, 1990, T&N filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
seeking damages from PIGA under the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Guaranty Act because the Association failed to assume American 
Mutual's payment obligations under the settlement agreement2 and 
under the terms of the actual insurance policies which were 
issued to Keasbey.3    
 It is undisputed that the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Guaranty Act and the Association were established in response to 
the social harms which result from insurance insolvencies.  Sands 
v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association, 283 Pa. Super. 
217, 423 A.2d 1224 (1980).  Every property and casualty insurance 
carrier in Pennsylvania is a member of PIGA.  Indeed, membership 
                     
2.   T&N is seeking to obtain the balance which remains due 
under the settlement agreement.   
3.   T&N also requested punitive damages for the bad faith 




in PIGA is a condition of an insurer's ability to write insurance 
policies in Pennsylvania.  One of the purposes of the Act is to: 
 (1) Provide a means for the payment of covered  
 claims under certain property and casualty 
 insurance policies, to avoid excessive delay 
 in the payment of such claims, and to avoid 
 financial loss to claimants or policyholders 
 as a result of the insolvency of an insurer . . . . 
 40 Pa. Cons. Stat Ann. § 1701.102. 
 
 By order entered May 29, 1992, the district court found 
that the settlement agreement is a matter which "arises under" 
the insurance policies issued by American Mutual as that phrase 
is utilized in section 1701.103(5)(a) of the Act.  The court 
denied summary judgment with respect to the other aspects of 
Count I without prejudice to renewal after the completion of 
discovery.  Summary judgment was granted in favor of PIGA with 
respect to T&N's claims which were based on the insurance 
policies because the settlement agreement nullified the policies.  
PIGA's motion for summary judgment on the bad faith claim was 
also denied without prejudice to renewal after the completion of 
discovery.   
 After discovery was completed, each party filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  By opinion and order entered May 
27, 1993, the district court held in pertinent part that while 
T&N was not a resident of Pennsylvania and that Keasbey's 
residence was irrelevant, T&N could rely on the residency of its 
underlying claimants and the right of those claimants to bring a 
claim against T&N to meet the residency requirement of the Act.  
However, PIGA would only be liable if the underlying claimants 
 
 
were Pennsylvania residents at the time of the insured event4 or 
if the claims were for losses to property which was permanently 
located in Pennsylvania and the claims would have been covered by 
a Keasbey policy.  If the underlying claimant changed residence 
during the time between exposure and manifestation and a policy 
was in effect, PIGA's liability was to be prorated based on the 
portion of the time the claimant lived in Pennsylvania during 
that period.  To ensure that recovery would be so limited, the 
district court established an analytic framework to determine the 
extent of PIGA's liability.         
 By order entered September 10, 1993, the district court 
certified the 1992 and 1993 orders for interlocutory appeal, 
specifically certifying seven questions for our review.5  By 
                     
4.   The district court defined the insured event as the 
period from exposure to asbestos to the claimant's manifestation 
of an asbestos-related disease.   
5.   The questions which were certified are: 
 
 1)  Did the District Court err in holding that the  
     settlement agreement arose out of insurance  
     policies? 
 
 2)  Did the District Court err in holding that   
     Keasbey's residence was not relevant under  
     Section § 1701.103(5)(a)(i)? 
 
 3)  Did the District Court err in holding that  
     T&N was not a resident of Pennsylvania? 
 
 4)  Did the District Court err in holding that  
     T&N could rely on the claims represented in the  
     settlement agreement and the residence of the   
             underlying claimants to meet 
the residency                      
requirement of the Act? 
 
 5)  Did the District Court err in holding that T&N 
 
 
order dated October 13, 1993, we granted the petitions for leave 
to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  For purposes of our 
review we have grouped the seven certified questions into three 
main issues: (1) whether T&N has a covered claim; (2) if T&N does 
have a covered claim, whether it has only one claim or a claim 
for each of the underlying asbestos claimants; and (3) if T&N 
does have a covered claim, whether the analytical framework 
established by the district court was appropriate.  Because we 
determine that T&N does not have a covered claim under the 
statute except for property damage and that only one claim is 
implicated, we need not reach question 3.6 
 
(..continued) 
     could rely on the claims represented in the  
     settlement agreement and the location of property 
     which sustained loss to meet the residency  
     requirement of the Act? 
 
 6)  Did the District Court err in holding that the  
     $299,000 limit for recovery applied to each of  
     the underlying claims? 
 
 7)  Did the District Court err in holding that PIGA's  
     liability for defense costs in the settlement   
     agreement was the smaller of the actual individual 
     amount or prorated amount of the costs? 
    (District Court's Order entered September 10, 1993) 
 
6.   Federal courts sitting in diversity "must apply the 
substantive law of the state whose laws govern the action."  
Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  The 





  A covered claim is defined in relevant part in 40 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1701.103 as:   
    5(a)  "Covered Claim" means an unpaid claim,  
 including a claim for unearned premiums, which  
  arises under a property and casualty insurance 
  policy of an insolvent insurer and is: 
  
      (i)  The claim of a person who at the time of 
the insured event resulting in loss or liability 
was a resident of the Commonwealth, or 
 
      (ii)  A claim arising from an insured event 
resulting in loss or liability to property which 
was permanently situated in this Commonwealth 
               . . . . 
 *  *  * 
 Thus, an essential element of a covered claim is that 
it arise out of an insurance policy.  PIGA argues that T&N's 
claim arises out of the settlement agreement, not out of the 
insurance policies, because the insurance policies were nullified 
upon the execution of the settlement agreement.  Therefore, T&N's 
claim should not be covered by the Act.   
 It does not appear that any Pennsylvania court has 
addressed whether a settlement agreement which is entered into in 
connection with an insurance policy could support a covered claim 
under the Act.  Courts in other states, however, have found that 
disputes arising from settlement agreements do constitute covered 
claims under their insurance guaranty acts.  See Buggae v. Yellow 
Checker Cab Co., 623 So.2d 906 (La. App. 1993); Lastie v. Warden, 
611 So.2d 721 (La. App. 1992), cert. denied, 614 So.2d 64 (La. 
1993); Betancourt v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Fund, 
170 Ariz. 296, 823 P.2d 1304 (1991); Thornock v. Pack River 
 
 
Management Co., 790 F.Supp. 1014 (D. Mont. 1990) aff'd in part 
and rev'd in part, 942 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1991); and London v. 
Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, 486 So.2d 56 (Fla. App. 
1986).  PIGA argues that these cases are not dispositive because 
the courts were not faced with the settlement of a coverage 
dispute, the settlement agreement did not nullify the underlying 
insurance policies, the settlement agreement did not act as a 
novation, and the cases did not involve a non-resident insured 
who was seeking recovery based on underlying claimants who had no 
rights under the settlement agreement.  We do not find these 
arguments to be persuasive. 
 The settlement agreement between T&N and American 
Mutual would never have come into being if not for the insurance 
policies.  The amount of money which was to be paid under the 
settlement agreement represented the total of the policy limits 
on all of the insurance policies.7  As a result, we find that the 
settlement agreement arose under the insurance policies and may 
support a covered claim provided that all of the other 
requirements of the Act are met.  To hold otherwise would 
discourage parties from entering into settlement agreements.8    
Thus, the district court did not err in holding that the 
settlement agreement arose under an insurance policy. 
                     
7.   A portion of T&N's defense costs was also represented 
in the agreement.   
8.   We also note that under section 1701.201(b)(1)(iv) of 
the Act, PIGA may review settlements to determine the extent to 
which those settlements should be contested. 
 
 
   
 III. 
 Our next question then is whether T&N is, or can be 
considered to be, a Pennsylvania resident.  Such a determination 
is necessary because only Pennsylvania residents may assert a 
covered claim under the Act.  See § 1701.103(5)(a)(i).  
Unfortunately, "resident" is not defined in the Act and it 
appears that no Pennsylvania court has yet interpreted the term.  
T&N suggests three methods by which it meets the residency 
requirement of the Act:  (A) it can use the residence of its 
underlying claimants, (B) it can use Keasbey's residence, and (C) 
it can be considered a resident of Pennsylvania.   
 
 A.  
 The district court held that while T&N was not a 
Pennsylvania resident and Keasbey's residence was irrelevant, T&N 
could use the residence of the underlying claimants to meet the 
residency requirement of the Act.  As a result, to the extent 
that T&N could show that an underlying claimant was a 
Pennsylvania resident at the time of the insured event, it would 
have a covered claim.  T&N's recovery would also have to be 
prorated if an underlying claimant changed his or her residence 
during the relevant period.   
 The district court grounded its decision to permit T&N 
to use the residence of its underlying claimants on the fact that 
the definition of "person" under the Act includes a claimant.  As 
a result, underlying claimants (tort victims) can have covered 
 
 
claims under the Act.  The district court then looked at section 
1701.503(b) of the Act which states that, except in the case of a 
first party claim for damage to property which has a permanent 
location, if a person has a claim which is covered by more than 
one guaranty association, he or she must seek recovery first from 
the association located where the insured resides.  The district 
court then reasoned that because of the interaction between the 
definition of "person" and section 1701.503(b), a non-resident 
claimant could rely on both an insured tortfeasor's residence and 
the right to make a claim in order to come within the Act.  
Otherwise, a non-resident claimant who was seeking recovery from 
the association where the insurer resides would not be able to 
meet the residency requirement of the Act.  
 While the situation presented here is the opposite of 
that described above, the district court stated that the analysis 
was similar.  Under section 1701.503(b), a non-resident insured 
did not have to rely on the residence and claims of the 
underlying claimants because the insured's residence determined 
where recovery was to be sought in the first instance.  However, 
the fact that section 1701.503(b) indicated that a person, who 
was defined as a policyholder or claimant, may have a claim which 
was covered under more than one guaranty association suggested 
that in certain situations, a non-resident insured could rely on 
the residence of the underlying claimants and the right to make a 
claim to meet the residency requirement.  This interpretation 
ensured that the underlying claimants would be able to recover 
damages from the insured.   
 
 
 While the district court noted that these claimants 
also have a right to proceed against the guaranty association, it 
stated that in cases where the insured is unable to recover from 
its own guaranty association9, it would be unfair not to 
interpret section 1701.103(5) to allow the insured to rely on the 
residence of the underlying claimants.  It also noted that such a 
result would discourage settlements, would lead to multiple suits 
which would delay payments to Pennsylvania claimants, and could 
encourage non-resident insureds to engage in delaying tactics to 
force the tort victims to bring actions against PIGA instead of 
continuing their suits against the insured.       
 We disagree with the district court's analysis.  The 
purpose of the Act is clearly to protect Pennsylvania residents.  
If the underlying Pennsylvania claimants can proceed against PIGA 
to recover for their losses, their rights are protected; they 
will not suffer any harm from the insured's inability to pay 
them.  Therefore, giving the insured the ability to rely on the 
underlying claimants' residence does not provide the underlying 
Pennsylvania claimants with money they would not have received if 
the insured was not permitted to recover under the Act.  The 
district court's analysis does not provide the underlying 
Pennsylvania claimants with any additional protection.  Rather, 
it merely allows a non-resident to make a claim against the Act.  
Such a result violates the intent of the Act which is to protect 
                     
9.   England apparently does not have an insurance guaranty 
association.   
 
 
Pennsylvania residents.  While it is unfortunate that T&N 
apparently does not have a guaranty association which it can 
approach for relief, this does not affect Pennsylvania and PIGA 
should not be forced to pay T&N's claim based on this reason 
alone.   
 We note as well that PIGA is authorized to pay 
"claims".  Therefore, the claims that are relevant are those that 
PIGA is being asked to pay.  Since T&N is the one with the claim, 
its residence is the one which should be examined.  As a result, 
T&N must be the one who was a resident of Pennsylvania at the 
time of the insured event which resulted in loss or liability.  
At the time of the insured event, T&N was a resident of England.  
Thus, we conclude that T&N cannot claim recovery from the 
Association by adverting to the Pennsylvania residency of its 
underlying claimants.   
 B. 
 With respect to whether T&N has a covered claim in its 
own right, T&N first argues that the district court erred in 
finding that Keasbey's residence was irrelevant.  In T&N's view, 
Keasbey's residence should be determinative because it was a 
Pennsylvania resident, the actions leading up to the asbestos 
claims took place in Pennsylvania, Keasbey's insurance policies 
were issued in Pennsylvania and PIGA would have had to pay the 
claim if Keasbey had not been dissolved.   
 The question of whether Keasbey's residence is relevant 
depends on what interpretation is given to the phrase, ". . . who 
at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or liability 
 
 
was a resident. . . ."  T&N argues that we should look at 
residency at the time of the insured event.  At that point in 
time, Keasbey was still in existence and was a Pennsylvania 
resident.  Therefore, T&N asserts, Keasbey's residence should be 
sufficient to bring T&N within the Act.   
 We do not find this argument to be persuasive.  The use 
of the word "resulting" indicates that a loss or determination of 
liability must occur before a covered claim will exist.  If the 
legislature had intended to provide coverage for persons who had 
not yet incurred a loss or liability at the time of the insured 
event, it could have so provided by using a phrase such as "who 
at the time of the insured event which may give rise to a loss or 
liability was a resident...."  The fact that it did not do so 
indicates that an actual loss or liability has to be suffered 
before a person may have a covered claim.  Therefore, unless an 
actual loss or liability is incurred, the person's residence is 
irrelevant for purposes of the Act.    
 The asbestos claims did not begin until 1978.  After 
1969, no claims could be maintained against Keasbey due to 
Pennsylvania's corporate dissolution statute.10  Keasbey had not 
sustained any loss or liability by 1969.  Since Keasbey has not 
suffered any loss or liability, it cannot have a covered claim 
under the Act and its residence is irrelevant. 
                     
10.   15 P.S. § 2111 (Purdon 1967), repealed and 
substantially re-enacted by 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1979 (1992).   
 
 
 Again, we note that since PIGA is authorized to pay 
covered claims, the claims which are significant are those which 
PIGA is being asked to pay.  Therefore, since Keasbey is not 
presenting a claim, its residence is irrelevant.     
 
 C. 
 Finally, T&N argues that it can be viewed as a 
Pennsylvania resident for purposes of the Act.  As mentioned 
above, it does not appear that any Pennsylvania court has 
attempted to interpret the meaning of "resident" with respect to 
the Act.  In Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association v. 
Charter Abstract Corporation, 790 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1992), 
the district court held that a corporation could have only one 
residence.  Recognizing that an individual person could only have 
one residence, the court could not ascertain why a corporation 
should be treated differently from an individual.  Thus, 
residence would be determined by either the state of 
incorporation or the principal place of business.  The ultimate 
issue of which location was to be used was not reached because 
the corporation in question did not meet either test.  See also 
Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress v. Iowa Insurance Guaranty 
Association, 461 N.W.2d 175 (Iowa 1990).  
 We find this analysis to be persuasive.  It is 
undisputed that T&N was incorporated in England and has its 
principal place of business in England.  As a result, we find 
that it is not a Pennsylvania resident under the Act. 
 
 
   T&N argues that since it is subject to jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania, it should be considered a Pennsylvania resident.  
However, the exercise of jurisdiction is not limited to those who 
are residents of the state which is attempting to assert 
jurisdiction.  As a result, if residence were connected to 
jurisdiction, it would increase the number of guaranty 
associations which could be liable, and lead to disputes 
regarding which association should be liable for the payments.  
This would defeat one of the purposes of the Act which is to 
avoid delays in payment.   
 T&N also argues that since the underlying claimants 
have brought suit against it because it is allegedly the alter 
ego of Keasbey, T&N should be able to use Keasbey's residence to 
come within the Act.  It is unclear whether any court has found 
that T&N is the alter ego of Keasbey to such an extent that the 
corporate veil should be pierced and that T&N should be held 
liable for Keasbey's actions.11  However, the Court of Appeals 
                     
11.   Several courts have addressed the relationship between 
T&N and Keasbey.  See Ward v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 
677 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1988) (T&N is neither the alter ego 
nor the successor of Keasbey.  T&N only owned Keasbey's stock.  
After the dissolution, Keasbey's assets were sold to companies 
other than T&N and T&N did not continue in any of Keasbey's 
product lines.); Kacprzycki v. A.C.&S., Inc., No. 88-34, 1990 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 16552 (D. Del. October 31, 1990) (T&N was not 
the alter ego of Keasbey and could not be held liable for damages 
allegedly caused by Keasbey);  Watkins v. Turner & Newall Ltd., 
Nos. 84-1742-17 & 86-0087-17, 1988 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8778 (D. Ga. 
1988) (T&N is not the alter ego of Keasbey and jurisdiction 
cannot be found over T&N based on Keasbey's presence in the forum 
state); and Colcord v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., No. 84-
912 (D. Colo. May 13, 1985) (plaintiff had failed to establish a 
prima facie showing that T&N so dominated and controlled Keasbey 
that the corporate veil should be pierced or that jurisdiction 
 
 
for the Fifth Circuit specifically found in Hargrave v. 
Fibreboard, Corp., 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983) that T&N's 
relationship to Keasbey was not sufficient for Texas to have 
jurisdiction over T&N through Keasbey.12  The Court also found 
that T&N was not the alter ego of Keasbey.13     
(..continued) 
should be found over T&N due to Keasbey's presence in the forum).  
But see City of New York v. AAER Sprayed Insulations Inc., (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct., November 1, 1990) (T&N's motion for partial summary 
judgment with respect to Keasbey's products on the basis that 
Keasbey was not T&N's alter ego denied); City of New York v. AAER 
Sprayed Insulations, 182 A.D.2d 516, 583 NYS.2d 911 (N.Y. App. 
Div., April 16, 1992) (affirming January 11, 1991 lower court 
decision denying T&N's motion for summary judgment because there 
were material issues of fact regarding whether T&N is the alter 
ego of Keasbey and whether T&N suppressed knowledge regarding the 
hazards of asbestos to avoid having to place warnings on its 
product) and Scharold v. GAF Corp., No. C-1-84-1062 (S.D. Ohio 
January 10, 1985) (motion to dismiss based on lack of personal 
jurisdiction denied because it was unclear that T&N was not 
Keasbey's alter ego and it was premature to rule on that 
question).   
 
 Three other unreported cases from the Southern District 
of Ohio reach the same result.  See Herper v. GAF Corporation, 
No. C-1-84-1028 (S.D. Ohio February 14, 1985), William & Letcher 
v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-1-84-515 (S.D. Ohio February 15, 1985) and 
Lloyd v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-1-84-397 (S.D. Ohio February 15, 
1985).  However, it should be noted that these cases did not 
engage in a separate analysis of the question.  Rather, they 
entered orders denying the motions to dismiss based on Scharold 
and Bowman v. Armstrong World Industries, No. C-2-81-1492 (S.D. 
Ohio, August 8, 1994), a decision which was also relied on by the 
Scharold court.  In addition, a copy of the Scharold opinion was 
attached to each of the orders.    
12.   It should be noted that Scharold referred to Hargrave 
and cited Bowman which held that Hargrave was distinguishable 
because the law in Ohio was that unless there is a hearing 
regarding jurisdiction, a plaintiff only needs to make a prima 
facie showing of jurisdiction.  A hearing on jurisdiction took 
place in Hargrave but apparently did not take place in Scharold 
or Bowman.   
13.   A successor liability claim was also brought against 
T&N but the Court fount that it had been waived.   
 
 
 In addition, T&N alleged in the complaint it filed in 
the D.C. District Court that it was being sued because it was the 
former stockholder of Keasbey and exercised such control over 
Keasbey that Keasbey was T&N's alter-ego.  The district court 
found that T&N was an additional insured under Keasbey's 
insurance policies because the definition of an "insured" under 
the policies included stockholders.  Therefore, the district 
court's finding was based on an interpretation of the policies, 
rather than a determination that Keasbey was T&N's alter ego.   
 Finally, the record on appeal does not provide any 
indication regarding the nature of the relationship between T&N 
and Keasbey beyond the fact that T&N was the majority and then 
the sole shareholder of Keasbey.  In its brief, T&N does not 
present any arguments establishing the existence of an alter ego 
relationship.  Rather, it merely states that some of the 
complaints which have been filed against it allege that it is 
liable because of an alter ego relationship between it and 
Keasbey.  In addition, there is no information regarding what 
happened after the sale - i.e., how the money realized was 
distributed, whether T&N retained any liability for Keasbey's 
past conduct, etc.   
 Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err 
in holding that T&N was not itself a resident of Pennsylvania for 





 We note that the Act does not limit recovery to 
persons.  Recovery can also be made with respect to any property 
which is permanently located in Pennsylvania.  Section 
1701.103(5)(a)(ii) provides: 
   (5)(a) "Covered claim" means an unpaid 
claim, including a claim for unearned 
premiums, which arises under a property and 
casualty insurance policy of an insolvent 
insurer and is: 
 *  *  * 
 
      (ii) A claim arising from an insured 
event resulting in loss or liability to 
property which was permanently situated in 
this Commonwealth. 
 
 Unlike section 1701.103(5)(a)(i), T&N does not have to 
be a resident of Pennsylvania to recover under section  
1701.103(5)(a)(ii) for damage to property permanently located in 
Pennsylvania.  To the extent that T&N's claims are based on such 
property, PIGA will be liable.   The question of whether any such 
property exists should be considered by the district court.  If 
the district court finds such property, the court must further 
determine whether an unpaid claim is present with respect to that 
property, in light of any recovery which might have already 
transpired.  The district court must consider whether permitting 
payment with respect to this property will result in a double 
payment, once to the property owner and once to T&N.  Finally, 
the district court must scrutinize whether T&N's claim is 
properly characterized as arising out of a loss or liability to 
the property itself.  In connection with this, the district court 
may consider whether the lack of payment is the result of the 
 
 
insolvency of the insurance company and its failure to pay the 
monies which remained due under the settlement agreement, and 
whether T&N's claim is thus transformed into a claim under 
section 1701.103(5)(a)(i) for which PIGA is only liable if the 
person bringing the claim is a Pennsylvania resident. 
  
 V. 
 As we have found that T&N may have a covered claim with 
respect to property permanently located in Pennsylvania, we must 
turn to the question of the number of covered claims present.  
The Act states that the maximum which can be paid for a covered 
claim is $300,000 less a $100 deductible amount.  PIGA argues 
that since T&N agreed to take a lump sum payment under the 
settlement agreement, it only has one covered claim which is 
subject to the $300,000 statutory limit less a $100 deductible.14  
T&N counters that the fact that it entered into one settlement 
agreement is not dispositive because it could have entered into 
separate settlement agreements for each of the underlying claims 
and/or insurance polices.  To allow it to have only one claim 
because it settled numerous claims in one agreement would elevate 
form over substance and be contrary to the policy encouraging 
settlements.  Finally, even if the underlying claims are not 
treated separately, T&N asserts that it is still entitled to 
recover the statutory limit for each insurance policy which was 
                     
14.   See § 1701.201(b)(i).   
 
 
issued by American Mutual.  Again, it does not appear that any 
Pennsylvania court has addressed this question.   
 The district court based its finding that T&N had a 
separate covered claim for each of the underlying claimants on 
the Connecticut Supreme Court case of Connecticut Insurance 
Guaranty Association v. Union Carbide Corp., 217 Conn. 371, 585 
A.2d 1216 (1991).  We find that such reliance was misplaced.   
 The Union Carbide case arose out of the 1984 disaster 
in Bhopal, India.  Over 500,000 claims were brought against Union 
Carbide.  The government of India assumed the right to prosecute 
all claims arising out of the disaster and all of the claims were 
consolidated into a single action.  In February of 1989, Union 
Carbide and Union Carbide of India15 entered into a settlement 
with the Indian government.  Union Carbide then approached its 
insurance companies for reimbursement of the payments it had made 
under the settlement agreement.  Union Carbide's solvent insurers 
paid to the limits of their insurance polices.  Three excess 
insurers whose policies provided for $32,500,000 in coverage 
became insolvent.16  Union Carbide then turned to the Connecticut 
Insurance Guaranty Association ("CIGA") for payment.  
 The question facing the Connecticut Supreme Court was 
whether Union Carbide had only one covered claim which was 
                     
15.   Union Carbide owned 50.9 percent of the stock in Union 
Carbide of India. 
16.   Even if all of the insurers had paid the full amount of 
their coverage, Union Carbide would still have been responsible 
for $217,500,000 under the settlement agreement.   
 
 
subject to the $300,000 statutory limit or whether Union Carbide 
had a covered claim for each of the Bhopal victims who had been 
paid from non-insurance sources under the settlement agreement.17  
CIGA argued that a covered claim is a claim for indemnification 
under a liability policy, not the separate claims of the tort 
victims.  As a result, Union Carbide had only six covered claims 
encompassing the six insurance policies which were issued by the 
insurance companies.  The Supreme Court of Connecticut found that 
under Connecticut General Statute § 38-175, when an insurance 
company issued a policy, it became absolutely liable once a loss 
occurred under the policy.  In addition, the statute also allowed 
a tort victim to proceed directly against the insurer if the 
victim had obtained a judgment against an insured that had not 
been satisfied within thirty days.  In light of both of these 
factors, the court found that the Bhopal victims had a cause of 
action against the insolvent insurers in connection with the 
policies they had issued.  In addition, under the Connecticut 
Insurance Guaranty Act, a covered claim included underlying 
claimants.  The fact that the Government of India had taken 
control of all of the claims and consolidated them into a single 
action did not reduce Union Carbide's claim to a single claim.  
Rather, the statute which authorized the Indian government to 
consolidate claims created a procedural device which gave the 
government the power to represent the victims and did not 
                     
17.   Since it was undisputed that Union Carbide was a 
resident of Connecticut, residence was not an issue. 
 
 
diminish Union Carbide's right of indemnification.  Consequently, 
the Connecticut court then affirmed the trial court's finding 
that the $300,000 limit applied to each of the underlying claims 
and that CIGA must pay the claims presented under the six 
insurance policies which were issued by the insolvent insurers.18  
  
 We find Union Carbide to be distinguishable.  Union 
Carbide settled with the underlying claimants.  The settlement 
agreement can thus be viewed as the embodiment of each claim 
which was filed against Union Carbide.  However, in the present 
case, T&N settled with the insurance company.  The settlement 
agreement is not the embodiment of the claims filed by the 
underlying claimants, as is demonstrated by the fact that 
American Mutual agreed to pay up to the policy limits on each of 
the policies it had issued.19  Payment was not related to the 
individual claims which had been filed.  As a result, we find 
that in light of the fact that T&N entered into a single 
settlement agreement with American Mutual which encompassed all 
of its claims against the insurance company, it only has one 
covered claim which is subject to the $300,000 statutory limit.  
We do not believe that we are exalting form over substance 
because T&N agreed to the terms and the form of the agreement.    
 T&N also requests recovery for its defense costs.  Upon 
                     
18.   The court also addressed other issues connected to this 
analysis which are not relevant here.   
19.   In fact, under the terms of the agreement, only T&N and 
American Mutual have any rights under the agreement. 
 
 
remand the district court shall also address to what extent, if 
any, T&N may recover from PIGA for its defense costs.   
 
 VI. 
 The orders of the district court which were certified 
to us are hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The 
matter is remanded to the district court for resolution of the 
property issue and the request for defense costs.  Each party to 
bear its own costs.   
RE:  T&N plc, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE GUARANTY 
     ASSOCIATION, Nos. 93-2011/2012 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 Many persons who charged that T&N was the alter ego of 
its subsidiary, Keasbey and Mattison Company (Keasbey), and 
therefore responsible for bodily injuries they sustained due to 
asbestos exposure, sued T&N.  T&N thereupon filed a declaratory 
judgment action against American Mutual in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia.  T&N's claim arose 
out of a policy naming Keasbey as the insured, although Keasbey 
had dissolved in 1967 (Maj. Op. at 4) and American Mutual had 
written its last policy to Keasbey in 1965.  The court found that 
T&N was an additional insured under the policy and directed the 
parties to attempt to reach a settlement.  They did, and American 
Mutual agreed to pay T&N a significant sum of money, more than 
half of which has been paid. 
 The settlement agreement explicitly provided that 
American Mutual, upon the execution of the agreement, would not 
only have no further obligations "based upon, arising out of or 
related to any policy of insurance issued to Keasbey by American 
Mutual," but that all such policies shall be considered 
"exhausted, null and void and of no further force or effect."  I 
cannot agree, therefore, that the plain language of that 
agreement, solemnly executed in settlement of then pending 
 
 
litigation in court, can be ignored.  The settlement agreement 
constitutes a substituted contract, and, therefore, whether it 
initially had its genesis in the policies written by American 
Mutual can leave no lingering liability arising under those 
insurance policies.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 I. 
 I agree with the district court and the majority here 
that Keasbey's residence is irrelevant and that T&N is not a 
resident of Pennsylvania.  (Maj. Op. at 7).  The majority, 
however, concludes that the lack of residency does not bar T&N 
from recovery because the Act does not limit recovery to persons, 
and permits recovery with respect to property permanently located 
in Pennsylvania.  Without any discussion at this point of the 
effect of the settlement agreement on any claim of T&N against 
American Mutual, the majority decides that if T&N's claim may be 
"properly characterized as arising out of a loss or liability to 
the property itself," the district court may find that PIGA is 
liable if the tort claimant is a Pennsylvania resident.   
 The majority appears to rationalize that if the 
original tort claimant was a permanent Pennsylvania resident who 
would have had a claim against T&N arising out of the asbestos 
condition of the resident's property, that in itself would 
suffice to permit T&N to recover, regardless of the settlement 
agreement between T&N and American Mutual.  The majority offers 
no explanation and advances no reasons for disregarding the 
 
 
specific language of the settlement agreement which plainly 
states that (a) no rights or benefits were conferred upon any 
person except the parties to the agreement, and (b) all policies 
of insurance issued to Keasbey and all obligations arising out of 
or related to any policy of insurance to Keasbey by American 
Mutual were "exhausted, null and void and of no further force and 
effect" upon execution of the agreement. 
 The result of the majority's expansive rationalization 
is to make the tort claimants the fundament of T&N's claim and 
the springboard for purposes of T&N recovery;  it completely 
obliterates the settlement agreement.  Stated another way, the 
majority has turned back the clock sometime prior to the 
execution of the settlement agreement and treats the agreement as 
if it never existed. 
 II. 
 A federal district court exercising diversity 
jurisdiction must apply the choice of law rules of the forum 
state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 
(1941); American Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1299 
n. 4 (3d Cir. 1975).  Accordingly, we must apply Pennsylvania 
choice of law rules in this case. 
 Pennsylvania courts generally honor the intent of the 
contracting parties and enforce a choice of law provision in a 
contract.  Smith v. Commonwealth Nat. Bank, 557 A.2d 775, 777 
(Pa. Super. 1989), appeal denied, 569 A.2d 1369 (Pa. 1990).  The 
 
 
Pennsylvania courts have adopted section 187 of the Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws which provides that: 
  (1)  The law of the state chosen by the 
parties to govern their contractual rights 
and duties will be applied if the particular 
issue is one which the parties could have 
resolved by an explicit provision in their 
agreement directed to that issue. 
 
See e.g., Schifano v. Schifano, 471 A.2d 839, 843 n. 5 (Pa. 
Super. 1984).  The settlement agreement contains a choice of law 
provision which provides "[t]his agreement shall be governed by 
the substantive law of the State of New York."  Therefore, this 
court should apply New York substantive law to determine the 
character of the agreement. 
 A substituted contract is a novation and "[a]n existing 
claim can be instantly discharged by the substitution of a new 
executory agreement in its place."  6 Corbin on Contracts, § 1293 
(West. Pub. Co. 1962) (footnote omitted); Malanca v. Falstaff 
Brewing Co., 694 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1982).  Novation is the 
"[s]ubstitution of a new contract, debt or obligation for an 
existing one, between the same or different parties."  Black's 
Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. Cent. Ed. 
 
 
 Under New York law,20 we are faced here with a classic 
novation and any suits by T&N must be based on the settlement 
agreement rather than the earlier insurance policies.  In Health-
Chem Corp. v. Baker, 915 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1990), Health Chem 
Corp. sought a declaration that the settlement agreement 
negotiated with a former director was invalid and required 
renegotiation.  The court of appeals, applying New York law, 
affirmed the district court's rejection of the corporation's 
complaint, and held that "[w]hen the parties to a contract enter 
into a new agreement that expressly supersedes the previous 
agreement, the previous agreement is extinguished, thereby 
reducing the remedy for breach to a suit on the new agreement."  
Id. at 811; Wigton v. Rosenthall, 747 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); Flaum v. Birnbaum, 120 App.Div.2d 193, 508 N.Y.S.2d 115 
(N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept. 1986). 
 There is a substituted contract or novation if:  (1) 
there is a valid former contract, (2) the parties agree to a new 
contract, (3) the parties form a valid new contract, and (4) the 
parties intend to extinguish the old contract.  Flaum v. 
Birnbaum, 120 App.Div.2d 193.  In this case, all the elements of 
                     
20.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 280, treats a 
novation more narrowly than does New York and defines it as a 
substituted contract including as a party one who was neither the 
obligor not the obligee of the original duty.  However, § 279 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:  "A substituted 
contract is a contract that is itself accepted by the obligee in 
satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty." 
 
 
a novation are met:  (1) there was a valid insurance contract, 
(2) the parties agreed to a new contract, the settlement 
agreement, (3) the agreement is a valid contract, and (4) the 
parties explicitly stated that the new contract extinguished the 
old contract upon execution of the agreement and would be of no 
further force and effect.  The settlement agreement, therefore, 
extinguished any rights that T&N enjoyed under the original 
policy.  "The substituted contract discharges the original duty 
and breach of the substituted contract by the obligor does not 
give the obligee a right to enforce the original duty."  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 279(2). 
 T&N's argument that American Mutual's failure to 
fulfill the terms of the substituted contract revives the old 
insurance contracts is contrary to the clear law.  T&N confuses 
novation with an executory accord without satisfaction.  Cf. 
Bandman v. Finn, 185 N.Y. 508, 79 N.E. 175 (C.A.N.Y. 1906).   
 It is the essence of an accord that the 
original duty is not satisfied until the 
accord is performed, a result that is 
sometimes suggested by use of the term 
"executory accord." 
 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 281, comment a.  It thus 
differs from a substituted contract "under which a promise of 
substituted performance is accepted in satisfaction of the 
original duty."  Id. comment e.   
 In National American Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 
448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 
 
 
1979), the court, applying New York law, distinguished an 
executory accord from a substitute contract.   
 An executory accord is, by definition, "an 
agreement that an existing claim will be 
discharged in the future by the rendition of 
a substituted performance."  6 Corbin, 
Contracts § 1269 at 75 (1962) (emphasis 
added) . . . In contrast, a substitute 
contract operates as its name implies -- as 
an immediate discharge and satisfaction of 
existing claims in return for the new 
contract, even though performance is to 
commence in the future.  Should a breach 
later occur, the creditor is limited to his 
rights under the substitute agreement. 
 
Id. at 643 (citation omitted). 
 
Thus, under the settlement agreement here, the old contract is 
dead.  The subsequent agreement extinguished the old one and the 
remedy for any breach thereof is under the superseding agreement.  
See Northville Inds. Corp. v. Fort Neck Oil Terms. Corp., 474 
N.Y.S. 2d 122, aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 930, 488 N.Y.S.2d 648, 427 
N.E.12d 1102 (1985).  Accordingly, the only remedy for a breach 
of the substituted contract is a suit on that contract. 
 III. 
 Therefore, in response to the questions certified by 
the district court, I would hold as to question 4 that it erred 
in holding that T&N could rely on the underlying claims resolved 
in the settlement agreement, and the residence of the underlying 
claimants to meet the residency requirement of the Act.  In 
response to question 5, I would similarly hold that it erred in 
 
 
holding that T&N could rely on the claims represented in the 
settlement agreement and the location of property which sustained 
loss to meet the residency requirement of the Act.  Under my view 
of the case, there is no need to reach the issues raised in 
questions 6 and 7.   I would answer the first three questions in 
the affirmative. 
